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Résumé / Abstract
Nous démontrons que si l’utilité est une fonction de la richesse relative, peut-
être à cause de la recherche du standing, alors, sous certaines hypothèses concernant la
courbature de la fonction d’utilité et de la fonction de production, les gens pauvres
peuvent rattraper les gens riches. Nous donnons des conditions suffisantes pour que la
distribution de richesse finale soit indépendante de la distribution initiale, ainsi que les
conditions suffisantes pour la stabilité au sens du point de selle.
We show that, if relative wealth appears in the utility function, for example due
to status seeking, then under certain conditions on the curvature of the utility function
and the production function, the poor will eventually catch up with the rich. We give
sufficient conditions for the final distribution of wealth to be independent of the initial
distribution, and conditions for saddlepoint stability in a two-class model.
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11. Introduction
Many economists have pointed out that it is not wealth per se that
is wanted; rather wealth (in the sense of relative wealth) is valued be-
cause it gives access to non-market goods such as status and influence.
The relationship between relative wealth and non-market goods was
aptly expressed in Adam Smith’s ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’:
“To what purpose is all the toil and bustle of the world?...It is
our vanity that urges us on...It is not wealth that men desire, but the
consideration and good opinion that wait upon riches” .1
Since the non-market goods are arguments in the direct utility
function of economic agents, wealth necessarily appears in their reduced-
form utility function2. The purpose of our paper is to demonstrate how
the recognition of relative wealth in the reduced-form utility function
can explain a number of phenomena, such as poor families’catching-up
with richer families.
Our paper is related to the coruscating articles by Akerlof (1976),
Cole et al. (1992), and Konrad (1992). Akerlof argues that status
seeking results in the “Rat Race” which reduces the welfare of all
participants. Cole et al. show how wealth may appear in the reduced
form utility function. Konrad considers a model with two classes of
agents: those who care about relative wealth, and those who care only
about their consumption. He shows that the latter may benefit from
the existence of the former. He also shows that society as a whole
may over-accumulate capital. Our paper contains a new contribution:
we provide an analysis of conditions under which poor individuals (or
countries) will be able to catch up with those who are initially richer.
The question of catching up was studied by Stiglitz (1969) under the
asssumption that individuals do not save optimally. Stiglitz showed
1Quoted by Cole et al. (1992, p. 1092). They also quote: “The boy with the
cold hard cash is always Mister Right because we are living in the material world
and I am a material girl.” [Madonna, ‘Material Girl’].
2For an interesting model leading to reduced form preferences, see Cole et al.
(1992)
2that if all individuals save a constant fraction of their income, then
eventually the poor will catch up with the rich. Kemp and Shimomura
(1992) demonstrated that catching up will not occur if individuals save
optimally (and care only about their consumption). In this paper, we
show that if individuals care enough about their relative wealth, then
catching up will take place under optimal saving.
2. The Model
2.1. Assumptions and Notation
Individuals diﬀer only in their initial wealth. Each supplies one
unit of labor.The measure of the set of all individuals is normalized
to unity. There are two groups of individuals: those who are initially
poor, and those who are initially rich. Their measures are α1 and α2;
α1+α2 = 1. The initial capital stock of a poor individual is k1(0) and
that of a rich one is k2(0) > k1(0). The question that interests us is
whether the poor will catch up with the rich in the long run.
Let ci denote the consumption level of type i individual, and ki his
wealth. Per capita wealth is k = α1k1 + α2k2. Define relative wealth
of i as zi = ki/k. The utility function of i is U(ci, zi) = u(ci) + v(zi),
where u(.) and v(.) are strictly concave and increasing. The strict
concavity of v(.) means that a poor person gets more pleasure from
a marginal increase in his relative wealth than a rich person. This
provides a strong incentive for the poor to accumulate.
The agregate production function is y = f(k). It has the usual
neoclassical properties. Let c denote per capita consumption. Then
k˙ = f(k) − c. In a competitive equilibrium, the rental rate is given
by R = f 0(k) and the wage rate is W = f(k) − kf 0(k).The rate of
interest r is equal to the rental rate, because there is no depreciation.
Individuals take the paths of k(t), W (t), R(t) as given. Individual i
solves
max
ci(t)
Z ∞
0
"
u(ci(t)) + v
Ã
ki(t)
k(t)
!#
e−ρtdt (1)
3subject to ki(0) = ki0, k˙i(t) = R(t)ki(t) +W (t)− ci(t), and
lim
t→∞ ki(t) exp
·
−
Z t
0
r(s)ds
¸
= 0 (2)
The Hamiltonian for the optimization problem of individual i is
H = u(ci) + v [ki/k] + ψ [rki +W − ci]
Hence we get the Euler equation
1
β(ci)
c˙i
ci
= [ρ− r(t)]− 1
u0(ci)k
dv
dzi
(3)
where β(ci) is the inverse of the elasticity of marginal utility of con-
sumption:
β(ci) ≡ 1
σ(ci)
≡ − u
0(ci)
ciu00(ci)
> 0 (4)
Since r = f 0(k), andW = f(k)−kf 0(k), we have the following system
of four diﬀerential equations:
k˙i = rki − ci +W = f 0(k)ki − ci + f(k)− kf 0(k) for i = 1, 2 (5)
c˙i = ciβ(ci)
"
f 0(k)− ρ+ (1/k)v
0(zi)
u0(ci)
#
for i = 1, 2. (6)
2.2. Steady state
It is useful to define the capital share and the elasticity of marginal
utility of relative wealth
γ(k) = kf 0(k)/f(k) and η(z) = −zv00(z)/v0(z) (7)
If there is a symmetric steady state with k∗1 = k
∗
2 = k
∗ and c∗1 =
c∗2 = f(k
∗), then k∗ satisfies
f 0(k∗)− ρ+ v
0(1)
k∗u0(f(k∗))
= 0 (8)
4Let us define the function φ(k) ≡ ku0(f(k)) [f 0(k)− ρ] .Then
Proposition 1:There exists a unique symmetric steady state k∗ >
0 if (i) φ(0) + v0(1) < 0, φ(∞) + v0(1) > 0 and (ii) for all k ≥ 0,
β(f(k)) ≥ γ(k) (9)
Proof: Since φ(k) is continuous, condition (i) ensures the existence
of a k∗ > 0 that satisfies (8). Condition (ii) ensures that φ0(k) > 0
and thus k∗ is unique. To show that φ0(k) > 0, we compute
k
d lnφ(k)
dk
= 1− γ(k)
β(f(k))
+
kf 00(k)
f 0(k)− ρ
Since f 0(k∗)−ρ = − v0(1)
k∗u0(f(k∗)) < 0, a suﬃcient condition for d lnφ(k)/dk
to be positive at k∗ is β(f(k∗)) ≥ γ(k∗).
Proposition 2: If, for all non-negative ch,zh, the following condi-
tion holds:
β(ch)η(zh) ≥ 1 (10)
i.e., the elasticity of marginal utility of relative wealth is at least as
great as the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, then all
individuals will have identical steady-state wealth and consumption
levels. (That is, asymmetric steady states do not exist.)
Proof: Note that any steady state (c1, c2, k1, k2) is a solution to
the following system of four equations
ci = f
0(k)ki + [f(k)− kf 0(k)] for i = 1, 2 (11)
0 = f 0(k)− ρ+ v
0(ki/k)
ku0(ci)
for i = 1, 2. (12)
where k = α1k1 + α2k2. Suppose there is an asymmetric steady state,
(c∗1, c
∗
2, k
∗
1, k
∗
2) where k
∗
1 6= k∗2 and c∗1 6= c∗2. Then, for a given value
k∗ = α1k∗1 + α2k
∗
2, consider, in the (kh, ch) space, the straight line
ch = f
0(k∗)kh + [f(k∗)− k∗f 0(k∗)] (13)
5and the curve
0 = f 0(k∗)− ρ+ v
0(kh/k∗)
k∗u0(ch)
(14)
If there is an asymmetric steady state, then these two graphs must
cut each other twice (at least); one of these points is (k∗1, c
∗
1) and the
other is (k∗2, c
∗
2). Now the slope of (13) is f
0(k∗), and the slope of (14)
is
dch
dkh
=
u0v00
k∗v0u00
= β(ch)η(zh)
ch
kh
(15)
Now if the curve (14) cuts the line (13) twice, then at one of these
points, say point A, the curve (14) cuts the line (13) from above. (See
Figure 1). At point A, the slope of the curve (14) is smaller than the
slope (= ch/kh ) of the ray OA that goes through the origine O. It
follows that at A, dch/dkh < ch/kh. In view of (15), this condition
cannot be met if (10) holds.
PLEASE PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE
2.3. Catching up: stability analysis
We now examine the stability properties of symmetric steady states.We
linearize the system (5) (6) and then evaluate all derivatives at the
symmetric steady state. We have the following matrix:
J ≡

f 0(k∗) 0 −1 0
0 f 0(k∗) 0 −1
a31 a32 a33 0
a41 a42 0 a44

where
a31 = βα1c
∗A+B
a32 = βα2c
∗A, a33 = a44 = ρ− f 0 = − v
0
k∗u0
< 0
6a41 = βα1c
∗A, a42 = βα2c∗A+B
with
A ≡ f 00 − (1− η)v
0(z∗)
k2u0(c∗)
, B ≡ v
00(z∗)
k2u0(c∗)
= −η(1)v
0(1)
k2u0(c∗)
because z∗ = 1
Proposition 3: If
β(c∗) ≥ max
"
γ(k∗),
1
η(1)
#
(16)
then the equation det [xI − J ] = 0 has two positive real roots and
two negative real roots, implying that the steady-state is stable in the
saddlepoint sense. This implies that the poor will be able to catch up
with the rich.
Proof: Subtracting the third row of xI − J by the first row times
[x − a33], and subtracting the fourth row by the second row times
[x− a44], we obtain
det [xI − J ] = det

x− f 0 0 1 0
0 x− f 0 0 1
−a31 − Y −a32 0 0
−a41 −a42 − Y 0 0

where
Y ≡ (x− f 0) (x+ f 0 − ρ) = (x− f 0)
Ã
x− v
0
ku0
!
(17)
Thus, det [xI − J ] = (a31 + Y ) (a42 + Y )− a41a32 = Y 2 + bY + d,
where d ≡ (βc∗)2B(B + A > 0, b ≡ βc∗(A + 2B). The characteristic
equation is a quadratic in Y . We get
Y1,2 =
−b±
q
(βc∗)2A2
2
Y1 = −Bβc∗ > 0
7Y2 = − [B +A] βc∗ = −βc∗
"
f 00 − (1− η)θv
0(z∗)
k2u0(c∗)
+
θv00(z∗)
k2u0(c∗)
#
Substituting Y1 into (17), we get
0 = (x− f 0)
Ã
x− θv
0
k∗u0
!
−Y1 = x2−x
Ã
f 0 +
v0
k∗u0
!
+
θv0
(k∗)2u0
[k∗f 0 − c∗β(c∗)η(1)](18)
Assume (16) holds. Then k∗f 0−βηc∗ ≤ k∗f 0−c∗ = − [f(k∗)− k∗f 0(k∗)]
< 0, and equation (18) has two real roots of opposite sign. Similarly,
substituting Y2 into (17), we get
x2 −
Ã
f 0 +
v0
k∗u0
!
x+Q = 0 (19)
Q ≡ v
0
(k∗)2u0
[k∗f 0 − c∗β(c∗)η(1)] + βc∗
"
f 00 − (1− η)v
0
(k∗)2u0
#
Hence
Q = c∗β(c∗)f 00 +
v0
k2u0
[k∗f 0 − c∗β(c∗)]
where c∗ = f(k∗). Thus Q < 0 if (9) holds.
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